Why Germany was unable to win the maritime war between 1914 -1918 and failed in her ambition to overtake Great Britain as the World’s foremost sea power.
“The
First World War was above all a maritime war, not in the sense that most of the
action was at sea, but rather in the sense that maritime realities shaped it”[1]
Maritime considerations were crucial to Britain during the First World War, her wealth and vast empire were based upon global trading links maintained and protected by the Royal Navy but in the decade before the outbreak of the war Britain was to see her global maritime dominance threatened by Germany who had global ambitions of her own. The 1908 and 1912 Navy Laws passed by the Reichstag and backed by the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, allowed the German Admiralty to commence the building of a battle fleet intended to be of a size that would be capable of mounting a direct challenge to Britain’s global dominance yet, despite this, she failed to do so.
The Anglo German Naval Race and German Admiralty War Planning
Following Germany’s
defeat of France in 1871 Germany viewed Great Britain as her closest rival in
terms of global dominance. The Kaiser had close family links with the British
royal family which bred a certain amount of resentment and envy on his part and
the success of Britain’s empire led him to view any international crisis of the
day in terms of naval power, emphasising to him the limitations that not
possessing a navy was having on German expansion. Britain’s empire was spread
throughout the globe and its wealth and commerce, built on its global trading
links, was protected by its Royal Navy, which at that time was twice the size
of the next largest navy owned by any country[2]. Many, including the
Kaiser, bought into the ideas of the US Admiral and naval historian Admiral
Alfred Mahan in his work “The influence
of sea power upon history 1660-1783” that the naval aspect of warfare had
determined the outcomes of the great European wars of the 18th
century. It was widely believed that naval supremacy was the key to economic
prosperity and international prestige and that naval supremacy was based on the
number of large battleships that a country owned.[3]
In 1908 and 1912 Navy
laws passed by the Reichstag were the trigger for the growth in the naval power
of Germany. Germany’s naval secretary Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz intended to
put Germany on an equal footing with Britain and so attempted to build a navy that
would rival that of Great Britain and challenge Britain’s undisputed position as
the world’s leading sea power thus posing a serious threat to Britain’s
security and a challenge to her maritime dominance. Indeed the German navy bill
of 1900 stated that “Germany required a
fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval power would
involve risks threatening the supremacy of that power” Tirpitz was
convinced that the struggle with Britain was for what could be termed the
financial “world monopoly” which was held by Great Britain.[4] However, to challenge
Britain meant that Germany would have to start from scratch as Germany’s navy
had only been in existence since the 1871 Franco Prussian war.[5]
Between 1906 and 1914 naval
rivalry became the major cause of antagonism between Britain and Germany. Tirpitz’s
vision was for an immense “blue-water battle fleet” so that when faced with the
might of the new German navy Britain would back down and accept Germany’s
demands and ambitions relating to colonial expansion.[6] In other words deterrence was
the primary purpose of Germany’s new fleet forming the basis of Tirpitz’s
justification for the vast increase in fleet size in the face of increasing
alarm from the German military over naval expenditure.
In memoranda of 1888, 1891 and 1894 Tirpitz had
outlined his strategy as to “annihilate
British Sea power” if Britain was to
refuse to recognise Germany’s claim for her “place in the sun”.[7] Germany’s intentions appear
obvious when viewed in the context of the decisions taken at war council
meeting of 8th December 1912 between the Kaiser and the leaders of
his armed forces. The Kaiser’s demands at this meeting included that the navy
prepare for war with both Britain and Russia, put preparations in place that
would enable them to be ready to torpedo Royal navy ships, lay mines the Thames
estuary and increase U boat production. These instructions were not carried out
and Tirpitz was able to concentrate on the development of his fleet of
battleships.[8]
Tirpitz also thought that what he called “future power shifts” in Asia and South
America would weaken the British empire and that Germany should build a navy in
order to take advantage of this decline in Britain’s strength.[9] In fact by the time war
broke out in 1914 Tirpitz felt that the German navy wasn’t yet ready to
challenge Britain and the reality was that the Imperial navy required at least
another five years of building and preparation. Tirpitz actively sought to
avoid war in 1914.[10]
Another problem for
Tirpitz was that his new fleet had not attracted new alliance partners to join
Germany despite his assurances that this would be the case,[11]relying on an assumed naval
deterrent when Germany gave its absolute backing to Austria in the form of the
so called “blank cheque”. Tirpitz had concentrated on the idea that Germany’s fleet
would deter Britain from becoming involved in the conflict on the side of
Germany’s enemies and appeared to be surprised when deterrence failed.
Ultimately Tirpitz failed to understand that Britain’s dependence on naval
supremacy meant that she would never tolerate a hostile naval challenge in
Europe especially from a country that had declared its intentions in terms of world
supremacy and global maritime domination. What Tirpitz viewed as a deterrent,
Britain viewed as a provocation, exactly the opposite to what Tirpitz had intended,
and the result was that Germany was forced to go to war earlier than Tirpitz
would have liked. This was the concern of many in the German government at the
time such as Friedrich von Holstein, the head of the political section of the
German foreign office, who was quoted as saying in November 1906 “the more we arm at sea, the more we push
England into the arms of France”[12] Naval rivalry did not
cause the war but it ensured that when the war did break out, Great Britain
would be on the side of Germany’s enemies.
In 1914 The German army
had gone to war based on the objectives of the Schlieffen plan, the details and
execution of which had not been co-ordinated with the Imperial Navy nor indeed
even with her own foreign office and certainly not with her allies, resulting
in the absence of a co-ordinated strategy where for instance the navy could
provide a role in supporting the army in certain circumstances.[13] Noticeably the Schlieffen
plan did not give cognisance to the transportation of British troops across the
channel nor explored how the German navy could have assisted the Imperial Army
in dealing with this threat despite the fact that Schlieffen had noted that he expected
British troops to cross the channel. It is possible that Schlieffen believed
that it would be the task of the Imperial Army to deal with them once they
arrived in Belgium rather than the navy.[14]
Tirpitz had gone to war
on the expectation that the Royal Navy would immediately offer the much
anticipated battle at sea or at the very least, close blockade, and as such, had
no alternative plan to fall back on when Royal Navy did not comply. Put simply,
the British position was a defensive one and the German Navy found itself faced
with the unexpected question of what to do if the British Navy did not come and
seek battle as was expected of them[15]. There were no operations
against ports or against the German fleet by the Royal Navy, nor did they
invade the Baltic. The Grand fleet remained as a “fleet in being” and at once
imposed its economic war and its distant blockade. No clear strategic concept guided the Tirpitz plan other than a
belief that the war at sea would be settled by a large scale sea battle.[16]
The conflicting aims of
the German military and navy are evident in the way that Tirpitz looked for
peace with Japan and Russia in order to concentrate on gaining superiority over
the western naval powers which was in direct contrast to the aims of the German
army who were intent on annexing lands in the east. Eventually the imperial
navy and army were to clash in the final year of the war over the issue of the
future of the Black Sea[17]. Because the German navy
was not considered in the context of German security needs, army war planning
gave scant attention to the navy and little consideration as to how the navy
could be best used.
The German war plan
didn’t include capturing French channel ports although Tirpitz did press for
the Belgian coast ports. After the assumed defeat of France and Russia the
Belgian coast was seen as something that would provide a vital strategic asset
for any future war against Britain.[18] Thus German naval
planners and army planners were opposed from the start and remained as
inconsistent throughout the conflict. Even within the German naval command
itself a sort of “strategic paralysis” set in as there were those who wanted
the immediate deployment of the High Seas Fleet to justify the vast amounts
that had been spent on it and there were those who wanted to preserve the fleet
to use as a bargaining chip at any future peace talks[19].
Not all of the German
high command were in agreement with the latter strategy. Commander of the
German forces Paul von Hindenburg stated in his autobiography that the fear or “sensitiveness”
that the Royal Navy had of a potential invasion justified the greater use of
the German fleet and that this would have tied up the British forces at home
thus relieving the pressure on the German army on the western front. He was not
in favour of “saving” the German fleet for use in peace negotiations stating
that “A calculation of this kind would be
absolutely erroneous, for a power which one dare not use in war is a negligible
factor when it comes to a peace treaty”[20]
The Anglo-German Naval
Race and British Admiralty War Planning
Despite the threat of the
Anglo German arms race Britain appeared to be in some respects remarkably
unprepared for war. The British government was preoccupied by internal affairs
and social unrest[21] and Britain’s empire
presented many issues in terms of defence that required consideration and so
defence plans or contingency plans[22] are probably a better
description than war plans however. Since 1902 Britain had a Committee of Imperial
Defence in place and so demonstrated some co-ordination between government,
civilian departments, the military and the navy.[23]
Sir John “Jacky” Fisher
was appointed as First Sea Lord in 1904 where he remained until retiring in
1911. He was reinstated into the role by Winston Churchill in 1914 before
finally resigning in 1915 in protest at Churchill’s Dardanelles campaign.
During his tenure as First Sea Lord, Fisher introduced many controversial
reforms in the attempt to overcome the stagnating effect that he thought nearly
one hundred years of relative peace had on the Royal Navy - “the long calm lee of Trafalgar”[24].
At the turn of the
century the ships of the Royal Navy were dispersed over the globe looking after
the interests of the empire with little concentration of strength of
force. The Royal Navy had been
successful in its peacetime functions such as the British intervention in the
slave trade but the dominance of the Royal Navy not been seriously challenged
and at the beginning of the century it appeared to have no rivals. This changed
with the passing of the German Naval Act and Britain was faced with the possibility
of a genuine challenge to her naval supremacy and the possibility that any
challenger would find the Royal Navy unprepared for war.
Fisher was one of the
first to recognise the threat of Germany however at that point the Admiralty
could not rule out a coalition between Germany and another powerful European
ally which gave rise to the prospect that the Royal Navy would be faced with a
combined enemy force that they would not be able to defeat.[25]
Throughout the nineteenth
century Britain’s policy was to maintain the balance of power in Europe to
prevent any single other state becoming dominant particularly at sea. Britain
was determined to maintain her “two power standard” against her next two most
powerful rivals, that is Britain must be powerful enough to face an alliance of
the next two most powerful countries with naval power at that time measured in
terms of possession of capital ships.[26]
The development of HMS
Dreadnought which sparked the naval arms race and which “rendered all other battleships obsolete” actually levelled the
playing field and took away Britain’s initial advantage. Fisher did not believe
that the construction of these battleships was the optimum use of resources
when it came to defending Britain but he defended this project for two reasons.
Firstly he preferred that the Admiralty build cruisers which he could see far
more use for but the Admiralty would not allow this and so instead he pushed
for the construction of Dreadnoughts as a means of protecting his naval construction
budget. Secondly, Fisher wanted to
create a sustainable working partnership between private ship building industry,
armaments firms and the navy and he intended to feed into this partnership as
much money as possible to keep it solvent as Fisher realised that private
companies could build ships faster than the royal dockyards, they used civilian
expertise and were not subject to unionism and strikes. During a war they would
be able to produce new ships whilst the royal dockyards were employed to repair
damaged ships.[27]
The success of this was seen in the rate at which British battleships could be
replaced when compared with German battleships.
Although he is most closely
associated with the development of the Dreadnought battleships, Fisher’s
reforms for the Navy included the re-deployment of the fleet in recognition
that the navy in its current form was not strong enough to dominate both home
waters as well as those overseas. Adopting Mahan’s theories about concentrating
the battle fleet in home waters was the obvious thing to do but would have
proved to be politically unpopular as it would have left the defence of
Britain’s colonies and empire weakened and exposed to enemy attack.[28]
Fishers “Flotilla defence”
was comprised of smaller cruisers, torpedo ships and submarines which would
patrol the home waters thus allowing fleets of the larger battleships to be
deployed to anywhere in the world they were required to counter an enemy
threat. Fisher also believed that advances in technology and communications had
altered the effect of geography on strategy so that the concentration of
British naval strength in home waters was the best way in which Britain and her
empire could be defended. A further consideration for the redeployment of the
fleet was that it gave the fleet the strategic advantage of being able to carry
out exercises and manoeuvres in the area of ocean where the fleet were actually
likely to be fighting – “the battle
ground should be the drill ground”[29]
The redeployment of the
fleet by Fisher occurred along with the political alliances that Britain made
with France and Russia, something that Tirpitz had not anticipated given the
historic animosity between Britain and these two new allies of hers. Not only
had Germany failed to deter Britain she had, as von Holstein predicted, pushed
France and Britain into joining an alliance which was also joined by Russia. Now
Britain could concentrate her naval forces in the North Sea while France could
concentrate hers in the Mediterranean and Russia in the Baltic and the Black
Sea finalising the feared “encirclement” of Germany by potential enemies.
Instead of acting as a deterrent Germany’s aggression became a catalyst for the
building of more and more battleships.[30]
In terms of having the fleet organised and the
battleships and reservists in place and ready to go to sea, the Royal Navy were
ready but another issue for the British and their unpreparedness to play the
part of the aggressor in 1914 was that, as described in Jellicoe’s “Grand Fleet” published in 1919, the navy
was unprepared for war[31] in other ways such as
lacking in mines and torpedoes, and in having few submarine defences. Social
reform was the priority of the Government ahead of defence expenditure other
than in the race to maintain the two power standard and conditions of modern
sea warfare were an unknown particularly in terms of facing unrestricted
submarine warfare.[32] At the start of the
conflict Germany was actually ahead of Great Britain in terms of engineering
and industry and in the production of shells, mines, torpedoes. On the whole
German ships were of a better construction than were British ships but the
weaker protection of British ships was down to the need for them to have greater
striking power in worldwide operations whereas German ships were designed for battle
in short range operations.[33] This was to have
implications later when the two fleets eventually met in battle and the flaws
in the British ship design were discovered.
The two fleets were to eventually
meet at the Battle of Jutland on 31st May 2016 where after many hours of
fighting there appeared to be no clear victor. The Royal Navy in fact sustained
greater losses than the High Seas Fleet but at the end of the day it was the
High Seas Fleet that turned and fled for home leaving the strategic position in
the North Sea unchanged. Given a large scale sea battle could have resulted in
the destruction of one or other of the fleets the naval commanders were very
cautious in their approach. The defensive mentality came across in Jellicoe’s
battle strategy at Jutland, “He fought to
make German victory impossible rather than to make a British victory certain”[34] The end result of the
Battle of Jutland, however, changed little for the royal navy in terms of
strategy.
Geographical and Economic
Factors
Overall Britain held
greater geographical advantages over Germany. Germany’s disadvantage in
geography would only be overcome by having a much stronger fleet so not only
was Germany’s starting position going into the conflict numerically and
logistically weaker but it was also in a position of weakness in regard to
geography.
As Admiral David Beatty
put it -
“the
British Isles form a great breakwater across German waters thereby limiting the
passage of vessels to the outer seas to two exits, one on the south, narrow,
easily blocked and contained, and the other on the north, of such a width
(155miles) that with forces at our disposal it could easily be commanded so as
to preclude the possibility of the passing of any hostile force without our
knowledge and without being bought to action by a superior force”[36]
At the outbreak of war the
Royal Navy had taken control of the world’s underwater cable networks so all German
communications had to be transmitted by wireless. The Germans believed that
improvements in wireless communications might offset their numerical inferiority
as it allowed real time communication but the effect was that these
communications gave their enemy the advantage as within four months of the
outbreak of war the British were in possession of all three German naval codes,
the merchant shipping code book, the imperial naval code book and the traffic
signals book. Listening stations were set up along the east coast and
intercepted signals were analysed and interpreted by academics in a newly
created admiralty department.[37]
Despite the obvious
advantages that this gave the Royal Navy over the German fleet these intelligence
intercepts were not always accurate which at times negated the advantage that
the Royal Navy had. During the Battle of Jutland Jellicoe had received a signal
informing him of Scheer’s location however during the day he had already
received two signals both placing Scheer’s fleet in the wrong place and he had
only received 3 of the 16 signals that were actually intercepted that day and
so he had no real context or understanding as to the true situation and by late
evening he was rapidly losing confidence in the accuracy of the information
with which he was being supplied. Scheer’s fleet escaped and Jellicoe did not
give pursuit.[38]
The objective of economic
warfare was to precipitate the collapse of the enemy’s financial systems and
the resulting effect of this on the economy would be to paralyse the enemy’s
military. There was a recognition that a long drawn out conflict would lead to
financial and social disintegration for all involved and as these countries
were ever more dependent on international trade their interlocking financial
systems made them economically interdependent as well as vulnerable. War
between great powers would precipitate a sort of mutually assured destruction
economically speaking and, on top of this, 90% of the world’s trade was carried
by sea and so the maritime aspect of war was critical.
In his book “The Great Illusion, Norman Angell
noted the “profound change in methods of
global trade to the expansion of European banking systems in the main British
banking system”. He predicted that any major European conflict would cause
catastrophic damage to the global financial system. During 1910 Sir Edward Grey publicly cited
Angell’s book twice and the Daily Mail Newspaper called it “the most discussed
book in years”.[39]
The aim of economic
warfare in this context was not the mere intervention of enemy trade or
“blockade” but also the maximisation of pressure upon economic systems
underpinning Germany’s economy by denying access to shipping, communications
and financial services.[40] These dimensions of economic
warfare were beyond the Admiralty’s competence and control and even beyond
those of the Committee of Imperial defence, The widespread expectation of war
in the last week of July 1914 generated a financial crisis and global financial
panic and prices dropped across the stock market.[41] The importance of the
global market can be seen in the quote from Robert H Brand MD of Lazard
Brothers (one of America’s leading financial services companies) “Before a single shot had been fired, and
before any destruction of wealth, the whole world-fabric of credit had
dissolved.”[42]
A question to consider is
whether full economic warfare would have meant the Britain could have defeated
Germany much earlier or whether this economic interdependence between countries
meant that the implementation of economic warfare would have led to the
destruction of British global finance as well as those of her allies.
Since the start of the
war the implementation of economic warfare was hindered by flagging political
willingness both in Britain and among her allies to use “offensive measures against Germany which would entail collateral damage
to her own economies”. From the beginning of 1915 there was significant
dissatisfaction with the blockade and the board of trade was receiving many complaints
that sales were being lost[43]and certain cases trading
with the enemy was unavoidable[44] Sir Maurice Hankey, the
Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, believed that the effectiveness
of economic warfare and the blockade could have been improved with better
information management as that which existed was haphazard and inaccurate. For
example, cutting off German supplies through neutral Sweden and Holland caused
diplomatic and economic difficulties as “to
starve Germany would mean to starve
Sweden and Holland too” and to involve Sweden would have consequences for
Swedish supplies to Britain’s ally Russia.[45]
In 1914 international transactions
depended upon telegraph cables, banks, insurance companies, and shipping.
British cable companies continued to control communications across the Atlantic,
technological as well as financial and geographical factors prevented effective
competition. American banks had only just started to compete with Britain in
the short term credit market so their connections with foreign banks were not
yet fully developed. The US merchant marine was not yet big enough to service
the needs of US exporters let alone foreign clients, and US insurance companies
“declined to issue policies unless they
could lay off risks on London”.[46]
A large amount of
contraband trade through neutral countries was financed by the City of London
and carried in British ships as identified by Brand. He discovered that “large credits are being opened for Holland,
Denmark and other countries and it is probable that at least some of this trade
finds its way through to Germany” Brand advised that “much German contraband was “probably” being financed by the City”[47]
On 7th January 1915 the
British government published a new royal proclamation intended to deny German
businesses worldwide access to banking facilities in the city of London and
making it an offence for banks to conduct business on behalf of enemy owned
firms even when such firms were located in neutral countries. It
demanded government intervention into the workings of the free market economy.[48] These measures met with
limited success.[49]
Lord Robert Cecil who was minister for the blockade from 1916 admitted that “the financial blockade was the least
successful of any measures undertaken”. Banks would never allow the
government to direct who could or could not be granted access to British
credit. The best the treasury could do was to receive returns so that they knew
who was trading with whom. Banks were requested to supply such
information but not required to do so.[50]
In a letter to Lord
Selbourne the minister of Agriculture, The Prime minister stated
“There
remains to be considered the result of economic and financial attrition. I do
not think that we shall starve the central powers into submission. They are too
self-supporting to enable us to achieve our end that way; but the financial
difficulties both of their governments and of the commercial and industrial
interests may bring them to their knees before the military force is exhausted.
But if we are to wear the central powers down by economic and financial
attrition we must be able ourselves to “stay the course” longer than they can,
and that is why I believe that finance is going to settle the result of this
war just as much as arms, and in the value of small economies as well as of big
ones”
Greater confidence
existed in the power of financial pressure than economic pressure, that is the
denial of financial services such as credit rather than just blockade[51] and the question arises
that maybe Germany would have been defeated sooner had the full extent of
financial warfare been implemented as originally planned. This of course has to
be balanced against the potential financial destruction that exacting full
economic warfare on Germany may have had on Britain herself as the world’s
markets and trading and credit systems collapsed. Either way Britain, with her
capital city, London, the hub of world trading was in a far more dominant
position in the world’s financial markets than was Germany and was in a
position in 1914 to use this advantage against Germany. Her strength can be
attributed to her long sea faring history of trading and naval strength which
protected her trade links something Germany, despite her brand new powerful navy,
could not imitate.
Prior to the war the German
government thought that it had enough supplies to last for about nine months
and, like Britain, it was dependent on imports for food. In the case of
conflict with Russia and her allies in all likelihood this supply would be cut
off meaning Germany would have to rely on imports from other countries – which
would be cut off by a British Blockade.[52] Tirpitz had recognised
the potential danger of blockade but the German government did not introduce
any preventative measures such as stockpiling due to all manner of political
and financial issues at a time particularly as the Reichstag finances were under
strain and stockpiling would have been seen as an admission of failure of the
Schlieffen plan to deliver the aforementioned quick result.[53]
Blockade successfully
denied supplies to Germany and formed the basis of her post war revolution. The
blockade was successfully enforced and maintained by the Royal navy who, as
noted earlier, made the most of Britain’s advantage in geographical location
with Germany’s responses to the blockade being submarine warfare, and latterly
food rationing, crop requisitions and the plundering of her occupied
territories all of which did little to help the situation of the German
population.[54]
Reports from the day note the famine conditions experienced in German cities
and contemporary statistics trace the decline in meat consumption of the German
population between 1914 and 1919. A report in a Swedish newspaper of January
1918 quoted reports from German life insurance companies whose statistics
showed that the death rate of the civil population was starting to compete with
the battlefield death rates and statistics for average monthly death rates show
that the average monthly deaths in 1913 were 78,820 and by 1918 were 191,320.[55]
By August 1918 the
plundering of German army food stocks and desertions from the army had begun
although the collapse of the German army on the Western front had started to
occur after the spring offensive when food and supplies had begun to run out.
Ludendorff’s explanation for the German defeat of 8th August 1918
was due to influenza, food shortage and a resulting breakdown in morale with
one source quoted as saying “officers
could only inspire men by telling them that there was no food in Germany, but
plenty of it in the French and British depots”.[56]
The viewpoint from Admiral
Scheer, Commander in Chief of the High Seas Fleet, was that “At the outbreak of the war the British
Admiralty had decided to adopt the strategic defensive, inasmuch as it hoped to
achieve its goal by the operation of the principle of “the fleet in being” for,
favoured by the geographical position of the British Isles in their relation to
the North Sea, it determined to cut Germany completely off from all traffic by
sea and thus strangle her economically by the quiet pressure of maritime power”
By 1917-1918 the UK-USA alliance was the most powerful economic bloc in the world and created global monopolies in the purchasing of food. Blockade underpinned this and gave the allies the power of coercion. Whereas Admiral von Holtzendorff had hoped that the submarine warfare would scare neutral shipping away, in reality it had the effect of cutting the flow of imports to Germany’s border neutrals and so reduced the quantities available for outwards shipments thus squeezing the central powers out of the world markets. Again, the German military and admiralty had made a serious misjudgement as its decision to adopt unrestricted U-boat action had completely the opposite effect from that which the Germans anticipated and bought a very powerful enemy into the war on the side of the allies tightening the stranglehold in which Germany was gripped.[57]
Conclusion
Ultimately Germany failed
to defeat Great Britain at sea and take her place as the world’s leading
maritime super power for a number of reasons.
Firstly, Britain had a
natural geographic advantage in lying like a breakwater across the entrances
and exits to the North Sea. The Royal Navy took full advantage of this
favourable geography and held the German fleet “in check”. This strategy for
ensuring the control of the North Sea underpinned the Royal Navy’s entire war
strategy and it was something that the German navy were unable to overcome.[58] Germany’s chief advantage, and one which she
failed to capitalise on, was that the British fleet always had to be ready to
defend any part of her empire which was coming under threat which put a strain
on personnel and this meant the German fleet held the initiative and could wait
and pick its moment for battle whilst using the downtime to train and make
repairs or improvements.
The German naval war
strategy depended on the Royal Navy attacking the German fleet without
consideration of the fact that as the Royal Navy already had control of the sea
all that the Royal Navy had to do was maintain their position. Once war had
broken out the Royal Navy did not immediately seek battle as Tirpitz had
assumed they would but had immediately set up a distant blockade which would
prevent the import and export of essential food and materials to and from
Germany.[59]Tirpitz’s
strategy was an “all or nothing” type of strategy where there was little room
for adjustment or manoeuvre.[60] The absolute belief in
Mahan’s theories and teachings about naval supremacy became for the German navy
a one size fits all theory that was designed to be applicable in all situations
and ignored many complex factors such as geography, strategy, economics and
politics.
It was the German navy
who stood to gain from a full scale naval battle not the Royal Navy.[61]Correspondence from the
Admiralty to Admiral Jellicoe backs this up “The British fleet is vital to the success of the allied cause. The
German fleet is of secondary importance; its loss would not vitally affect the
cause of the central powers and it can therefore, be risked to a much greater
extent than the British fleet”
Britain had everything to
lose from a large naval engagement and that the Germans had everything to gain
and therefore Jellicoe’s primary objective at the Battle of Jutland was to hold
on to British command of the sea[62] and this he achieved
despite the lack of a decisive victory. Although it was not a great decisive
victory by Trafalgar standards, it was still a victory, after all you can lose
most of your chess pieces in a game of chess but still win by putting the king
in “check” with one other piece.[63]
German naval war aims as
laid down in the Schlieffen plan and the Tirpitz plan were based around
Germany’s preoccupation with British global dominance at “the grand strategic
level” through which Germany attempted European hegemony and global maritime
dominance at the same time but had neither the resources nor the leadership to
achieve either.[64]
As the German General Wilhelm Groener admitted in 1919 “we struggled unconsciously for world dominion before we secured our
continental position” Germany was not able to look past battle at sea as
being an end in itself and had no all-encompassing strategy which would have
enabled her to capitalise on a victory at sea. If she had been the victor at
the battle of Jutland she would still have had to address the issues of
geographical and financial inferiority, not to mention American suspicion.
Germany failed in her war
time objectives, she failed to defeat the Royal Navy in the North Sea and
failed in the destruction of the allied army on the western front. There was no
co-ordination of strategy between the armed forces, the state, her allies and
political and military leaders each jealously guarded their own roles. Army and
navy, finance and resources, industrial production and logistical planning were
never regarded in the context of strategic war planning such as how the use of
the German navy could have assisted the army. There was a focus on building
larger and more powerful battleships but Germany was unable to develop any
piece of technology which would have given her a ground breaking edge over the
British fleet.
In his book ‘The Pity of
War’ Niall Ferguson states that few historians believe that Germany could have
won the war as they forgot the definition of war as defined by Clausewitz – “war is
the continuation of political intercourse with the intermixing of other means”
and that Germany became preoccupied with the act of warfare itself rather than
the “political intercourse”[65]that she saw victory in a
great sea battle as her war aims for her navy and as an end in itself. Since
the original purpose of the creation of the High Seas Fleet and the Dreadnought
arms race was to deter the British from war against Germany, it had failed and
because it had failed it had lost its relevance.[66]
Britain had a
considerable advantage in her global trade links and her wealth. Although
technological advances had done little to break the deadlock and give one side
and advantage over the other in battle, technological revolutions in
communications, transportation and financial services had facilitated the global
spread of market capitalism and the growth of international commerce with
London at the centre of the world’s financial markets and consequently other industrialised
nations, including Germany, came to depend on an uninterrupted flow of maritime
trade.
The economic situation
led British naval planners to see the vulnerability of Germany and looked at
how
they could best use Britain’s monopoly control over shipping, financial
services and global communications to put pressure on Germanys economy while mitigating
the effects on her own and between 1905-1908 the broad outlines were formed for
an “economic war strategy” over Germany. This strategy was formed with both
state and civilian expertise and the British government was successful in
exploiting civilian expertise. The basis of the strategy was that Britain would
take measures to severely hurt the financial systems upon which Germany
depended to fight the war.[67] On 5th August 1914
Britain implemented economic warfare but within a fortnight this was halted
under pressure from bankers, businessmen and civilian departments in the government
who resented admiralty control and neutral countries who persuaded the
government that it was not in British national interest to endanger the
security of the global trading system. At this point there was still confidence
on both that this would be a short war.[68]
Increasing pressure from
the USA was another factor which led to the British government suspending
economic warfare however it became obvious by Christmas that the war would not
be the short conflict that many believed and by then the chance to defeat
Germany through what Lambert terms a “sudden imposition of an economic
stranglehold” had passed. Admiralty attention then focused on blockade as the
approach which was less disruptive to the world’s economic systems and this was
a strategy which relied completely on the strength of the Royal Navy.
Ultimately Germany was
unable to win a protracted maritime war against an enemy with access to and the
control of the world’s resources, trade links and finance and, in cases where
she did hold an advantage, she was unable to capitalise on that advantage. The
two biggest failures of Germany were firstly to ensure that Britain entered the
war on the side of Germany’s enemies and secondly, through her attempts to
break British links to the rest of the world by U boat warfare, she managed to
bring the USA into the war on the side of her enemies. Germany formed her plans
based on a willingness to gamble on these two points. In both cases she was
wrong.[69]
[1]
Freidman, Norman (2014) Fighting the
Great War at Sea: Strategy, Tactics and Technology. Naval Institute Press,
Maryland, USA. P12
[2] Rubin,
Louis B Jnr. “The Continuing Argument
over Jutland” in Virginia Quarterly
Review. 2001, Volume 77, Issue 4. P584
[3] Sumida,
Jon Tetsuro. “Geography, Technology, and British Naval Strategy in the
Dreadnought Era” in Naval War College Review, Summer 2006, Volume
59 No.3. P90
[4]Herwig,
Holger H. “Admirals versus Generals: The War Aims of the German Imperial Navy,
1914-1918” in Central European History, Vol 2. Issue 03, Sept 1972. P222
[5]
Herwig, Holger H. “Through the Looking Glass: German Strategic Planning Before
1914” in Historian Vol 77 Issue 2
Summer 2015. P304
[6]
Maurer, John H. “Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race before World War
1: Lessons for Today?” Political Science
Quarterly; Summer 1997 112, 2. P287
[7] Herwig,
Holger H. “Through the Looking Glass: German Strategic Planning Before 1914” in
Historian Vol 77 issue 2 Summer 2015
P305
[8] Herwig,
Holger H. “Through the Looking Glass: German Strategic Planning Before 1914” in
Historian Vol 77 issue 2 Summer 2015
P312
[9]
Herwig, Holger H. “Admirals versus Generals: The War Aims of the German
Imperial Navy, 1914-1918” in Central European History, Vol 2. Issue
03, Sept 1972. P210
[10]
Ibid. P211
[11]
Herwig, Holger H. “Through the Looking Glass: German Strategic Planning Before
1914” in Historian Vol 77 Issue 2
Summer 2015. P304
[12]
Marder, Arthur J. (1970) From the
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume 5. Victory and Aftermath: 1918-1919.
Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley. P335.
[13]
Herwig, Holger H. “Through the Looking Glass: German Strategic Planning Before
1914” in Historian Vol 77 Issue 2
Summer 2015. P298
[14] Kelly,
Patrick J. (2011) “Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy”. Indiana University
Press, Indiana, USA. P379
[15]
Ibid. P303
[16]
Mombauer, Annika (2010) Chapter 3 “German
War Plans” in War Planning 1914, Ed.
Hamilton, Richard F & Herwig, Holger H. Cambridge University Press. New York,
USA. P66
[17]Herwig,
Holger H. Admirals versus Generals: The War Aims of the German Imperial Navy,
1914-1918 in Central European History,
Vol 2. Issue 03, Sept 1972. P225
[18]
Herwig, Holger H. Admirals versus
Generals: The War Aims of the German Imperial Navy, 1914-1918 in Central European History, Vol 2. Issue
03, Sept 1972. P226
[19]Herwig
Holger (2010) Chapter 8 “Conclusions”
in War Planning 1914. Ed Hamilton,
Richard F & Herwig, Holger H., Cambridge University Press. New York, USA.
P249
[20]
von Hindenburg, Marshal Paul (1920) Out
of My Life. Cassell and Company Ltd, London, New York, Toronto and
Melbourne. P146
[21]
Goldrick, James “The Impact of War: Matching Expectation with Reality in the
Royal Navy in the First Months of The Great War at Sea” in War in History 2007 14 (1) P22
[22]
Neilson, Keith (2010) Chapter 6 Great Britain in War Planning 1914, Ed Hamilton, Richard F & Herwig, Holger H.
Cambridge University Press, New York USA. P178
[23]
Strachan, Hew (2003) The First World War.
Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. London. P178
[24]
Gordon, Andrew. (2005) The Rules of the
Game: Jutland and British Naval Command. John Murray Publishers. London.
P495
[25] Sumida,
Jon Tetsuro. “Geography, Technology, and British Naval Strategy in the
Dreadnought Era” in Naval War College Review, Summer 2006, Volume
59 No.3. P93
[26] Bell,
Christopher M. Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston
Churchill at the Admiralty 1911-1914 in War
in History, 18(3) 2011
[27] Lambert,
Nicholas A (1999) Sir John Fisher’s naval
revolution. University of South Carolina Press. South Carolina. P147
[28]
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. “Geography, Technology, and British Naval Strategy in the
Dreadnought Era” in Naval War College
Review, Summer 2006, Volume 59 No.3. P100
[29]
Marder, Arthur J. (1961) From the
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Volume 1: The Road to War 1904- 1914. Seaforth
Publishing. Barnsley.P43
[30] Friedman, Norman (2014) Fighting the Great War at Sea: Strategy,
Tactics and Technology. Naval Institute Press, Maryland, USA. P25
[31]
Jellicoe, Admiral Viscount John (1919)
The Grand Fleet 1914-1916. George H Doran Company. New York. P25
[32]
Marder, Arthur J. (1970) From the
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume 5. Victory and Aftermath: 1918-1919.
Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley. P309.
[33]
Ibid. P311
[34]
Marder, Arthur J. (1970) From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume 3.
Jutland and After: May to December 1916. Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley.
P226
[35]
Marder, Arthur J. (1970) From the
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume 5. Victory and Aftermath: 1918-1919.
Seaforth Publishing. Barnsley. P334
[36]
Strachan, Hew (2003) The First World War.
Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. London. P196
[37]
Friedman, Norman (2014) Fighting the
Great War at Sea: Strategy, Tactics and Technology. Naval Institute Press,
Maryland, USA. P199
[38]Gordon, Andrew (1996) The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command. John
Murray (Publishers). London. P422
[39] Lambert,
Nicholas A. (2012) Planning Armageddon:
British Economic Warfare and the First World War. Harvard University Press.
London.P125
[40]
Ibid. P137
[41]
Ibid. p187
[42]
Ibid. p189
[43]
Ibid p342
[44]
Ibid p346
[45]
Ibid p407
[46]
Ibid. P355
[47]
Ibid p355
[48]Ibid.
p124
[49]
Ibid p356
[50]
Ibid P361
[51]
Ibid, P441
[52]
Friedman, Norman (2014) Fighting the Great War at Sea: Strategy, Tactics and Technology.
Naval Institute Press, Maryland, USA.P22
[53]
Kelly, Patrick J. (2011) Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy. Indiana University Press,
Indiana, USA. P391
[54]
Howard, N.P “The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade
of Germany 1918-19” in German History,
04/1993, Volume 11 Issue 2. P162
[55]
Ibid.. P166
[56]
Ibid. P172
[57] Strachan,
Hew (2003) The First World War. Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. London.
P221
[58]
Marder, Arthur J. (1970) From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume
5. Victory and Aftermath: 1918-1919. Seaforth Publishing. Barnsley.P299
[59]
Rubin, Louis B jnr, “The Continuing Argument over Jutland” in Virginia Quarterly Review. 2001, Volume
77, Issue 4. P586
[60] Herwig, Holger H. “Through the
Looking Glass: German Strategic Planning before 1914” in Historian Volume 77 issue 2, Summer 2015.P302
[61]
Ferguson, Niall (1998) The Pity of War.
Penguin Books. London. P283
[62]
Marder, Arthur J (1978) From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume
3. Jutland and After: May to December 1916. Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley.P230
[63] Gordon,
Andrew. (2005) The Rules of the Game:
Jutland and British Naval Command. John Murray Publishers. London. P569
[64]
Herwig, Holger H. “Through the
Looking Glass: German Strategic Planning before 1914” in Historian Volume 77, issue 2, Summer 2015. P311
[65]
Ferguson, Niall (1998) The Pity of War.
Penguin Books. London. P283
[66]
Ibid. P563
[67]
Lambert, Nicholas A. (2012) Planning Armageddon: British Economic
Warfare and the First World War. Harvard University Press. London. P498
[68]
Ibid. P499
[69]
Ferguson, Niall (1998) The Pity of War. Penguin Books. London. P282
